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Summary 
 
Tax experiments have been gaining momentum in recent years, although this literature dates 
back several decades. With new developments in methods and data availability, tax 
experiments have gradually moved away from lab settings and towards the field. This 
movement from the lab to the field has happened against the background of the ‘credibility 
revolution’ in applied economics, which has seen more rigorous methods applied to policy 
relevant questions, and of the availability to researchers of administrative data from tax 
returns. These developments have allowed significant advances in the experimental 
literature on tax compliance. This paper reviews this literature, giving particular attention to 
field experiments using administrative data, but putting them in the broader context of the 
compliance literature. A particular effort is made to take a global perspective, in a literature 
that is only recently seeing the emergence of evidence from Africa, Latin America and Asia.  
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1 Introduction
Tax compliance is certainly amongst the greatest obstacles that tax administrations face in
mobilising revenues. It has to do with the extent to which citizens comply with tax laws
or, conversely, evade and avoid taxes. Tax compliance has obvious e↵ects on the level of tax
collections: the lower the level of compliance, the less the revenues readily collected by the
government. However, it also has important implications in terms of tax administration. When
compliance is low, the government has to resort to coercion and aggressive enforcement to raise
revenues. Not only are these methods of collection costly for tax administrations, particularly
in low-income countries; but also they denote a relation between citizens and the state based on
force and fear rather than a healthier understanding of the fiscal contract underlying taxpaying.
Clearly in any country taxpaying is the result of both quasi-voluntary compliance and strong
institutions. It would be simplistic to think that all taxpayers comply with tax laws just because
they think this is a good thing to do. An element of coercion is present in most cases. For
example, withholding procedures make it very di cult for employees to evade taxes on their
wages. Therefore most of them do not have the choice of whether to evade or not. At the same
time, it is also clear that the observed level of tax compliance is too high to be only the result
of coercion (Andreoni et al., 1998; Alm et al., 1992). Most countries simply do not have the
capacity to control and audit a large amount of taxpayers. Therefore the right question to ask
may be ‘Why do people pay tax?’ rather than ‘Why do they evade?’ (Alm et al., 1992).
The answer is likely to be a mix of deterrence, related to the probability of audit and
sanctions, and a range of factors that are often referred to as tax morale. Although there is no
uniform definition for tax morale, a recent review (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014) unpacked five
main mechanisms through which it can operate: 1) intrinsic motivation, 2) reciprocity, 3) peer
e↵ects and social influences, 4) culture, and 5) information imperfections and deviations from
expected utility.
The literature on tax compliance is vast and diverse, spanning from quantitative to qual-
itative analyses and from surveys to lab games. Despite several di↵erences in methods and
approaches, the kind of questions asked, the underlying hypotheses and the theoretical founda-
tions are very similar. In most cases the theoretical framework can be traced back to the model
of taxpayer behaviour of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). These authors model tax evasion
based on the theoretical frameworks used in the economics of crime (such as Becker (1968)) and
the economics of uncertainty (such as Mossin (1968)). They hold that a taxpayer’s decision on
whether to evade, and to what extent, is influenced by the expected economic returns to evasion.
These returns are determined by the benefits of evasion, a↵ected by the tax rate and taxable
income; and by its costs, influenced by the probability of being detected and the size of sanctions
if found guilty. However researchers soon realised that if taxpayers acted purely according to
this model, we would observe much higher levels of tax evasion. This observation has spurred
researchers to include other factors in the model, such as social and moral considerations, which
are likely to a↵ect the decision on evasion (Myles and Naylor, 1996; Traxler, 2010).
Based on these theoretical frameworks, the empirical literature has tested the validity of
such determinants of compliance in practice. The obvious problem in doing so is that it is
di cult to get honest answers about dishonest behaviour. For this reason, survey-based studies
have focussed on perceptions of tax compliance rather than actual behaviour. Typically, they
ask indirect questions such as ‘Do you think most people believe they should honestly declare
income on their tax return?’. There are already a number of good reviews of this literature,
such as Slemrod (2007) and, more specifically on African countries, Fjeldstad et al. (2012).
The survey-based literature o↵ers very useful insights into the question of why people pay tax.
However, it su↵ers from a major drawback: the attitudes that people reveal in surveys may not
accurately reflect their actual behaviour when faced with the real consequences of tax evasion
and avoidance (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977).
Tax experiments (TE) address this drawback by looking at real taxpayer behaviour rather
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than perceptions – although section 1.1 makes important distinctions on the level of realism
of di↵erent types of TE. This paper reviews the evidence emerging from this literature, paying
particular attention to the growing number of large-scale field experiments. It proceeds as
follows. Section 1.1 provides an overview of di↵erent types of tax experiments and their evolution
in time. Against this background, section 1.2 states the specific aim and relevance of this review.
Section 2 represents the core of this paper and summarises the main findings in the literature,
classified by determinant of compliance. Finally, section 3 critically takes stock of this literature
and looks forward to its future.
1.1 Speaking to theorists, searching for facts, and whispering in the ears of
princes
Tax experiments use experimental methods to identify causal e↵ects of the determinants of
compliance. The authors in the early TE literature (Spicer and Thomas, 1982; Friedland et al.,
1978) argue that such causal links could be identified in a lab setting, where it is possible
to control the environment and independent variables better than in real-life or survey-based
research. They also argue that the artificiality of the lab allowed them to circumvent the problem
of getting honest answers about dishonest behaviour by working within hypothetical settings.
The more recent TEs instead turned to administrative data from tax returns, and the causal
links are established thanks to randomisation. These are two separate types of TE, as discussed
in more detail in this section. While the latter (field TE) is more relevant to understand real
taxpaying behaviour and inform policy, the former (lab TE) helps to understand the origins and
theoretical foundations of this literature.
In his 2002 review of tax experiments, Benno Torgler classified the first type of TE in
two categories labelled ‘speaking to theorists’ and ‘searching for facts’, based on the definition
provided by Roth (1995) (Torgler, 2002). In both cases, the primary issue of interest is tax
compliance, with a common focus on income taxation – although similar arguments can be
made for other taxes. The first category includes lab experiments aimed primarily to test
theories, and whose results feed back into the theoretical debate and literature. In particular,
several early studies tested the empirical validity of the economic model of taxpayer behaviour of
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). These speaking to theorists studies therefore focused primarily
on the role of deterrence, sanctions and expected economic returns to explain compliance (Spicer
and Thomas, 1982; Friedland et al., 1978; Beck et al., 1991; Spicer and Hero, 1985). In this case,
experimenters speak to theorists. The typical lab experiment would involve a group of students
who are faced with the decision on how much income to report, based on a set of given variables
including, for example, the tax rate, the probability of audit, and sanctions. The artificial lab
setting then allows the researcher to change these variables and to observe how the participants’
decisions change as a response.
The second category, searching for facts, includes experiments that analyse variables that
are not explicitly included in the traditional economic models, but that are motivated instead by
the results of other experiments and by observations of what actually happens in the real world.
One of these observations is that the levels of compliance in many countries are much higher than
those predicted by purely economic models. This has prompted researchers to explore the role
of public goods, and moral and social factors in tax compliance, in addition to the traditional
economic considerations. In this case, experimenters are talking to each other (Torgler, 2002).
Although experiments looking at these issues are searching for the facts, they speak to theorists
too, since the new observed patterns can feed back into the theory to develop existing models
further.
Speaking to theorists and searching for facts studies have some common characteristics. First,
they typically use students as experimental subjects. While students respond to the incentives
set out in the experiment, they are not real taxpayers and they may not have any experience
at all with taxpaying in real life. Second, these studies usually rely on small samples, often
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involving only a small number of students in repeated rounds. This presents problems related to
statistical power, and the resulting estimates may not be stable and reliable. Finally, they use
largely artificial experimental settings, despite e↵orts to move to more realistic environments.
In a lab setting, the individuals involved obviously know that they are part of a study and
they may behave di↵erently than they would under the pressures of real life. Behaviour in the
artificial environment of the lab is likely to di↵er from actual decisions when faced with a real
social context and real consequences of wrongdoing. This problem has largely prevented lab
TE from having much policy impact. Therefore lab TE have been well suited to understand
the theoretical mechanisms that drive compliance, but the relevance of their findings in real
taxpaying situations has to be tested in the field.
In an attempt to achieve greater realism in tax experiments, some researchers have moved
the lab to the field (lab-in-the-field TE). Although this helped in getting insights into cross-
cultural di↵erences (Cummings et al., 2009), they still su↵er from very similar methodological
shortcomings.
Many of the drawbacks of lab TE were overcome with the emergence of large-scale field TE.
Following the categorisation proposed by Roth (1995), these TE can be labelled as ‘whispering
in the ears of princes’, as experimenters aim to speak to policymakers. To do so, the lab setting
is substituted with real life situations: the participants in the study are real taxpayers, the data
comes from real returns, and the experiment occurs in the normal taxpaying environment where
the main counterpart is the tax administration. The typical field tax experiment is based on
a comparison of randomly selected treatment and control groups. The treatment consists of
the provision of information that is meant to change key determinants of tax compliance, like
perceptions on the probability of audit, fairness and tax morale (with all the aspects it encom-
passes). This information is typically delivered through a letter that highlights, for example,
the fact that the tax administration routinely carries out audits and that those who are caught
evading face severe fines; or the importance of paying taxes to finance important public services
such as schools and hospitals. Because the participants in the treatment and control groups are
chosen based on randomisation, they are very similar with respect to all other aspects such as
age, income, and location. The only di↵erence between groups is therefore whether or not they
received the informational treatment in the form of a letter. By observing the di↵erences in
taxpayer behaviour between groups, and before and after receiving the letters, researchers can
establish the causal e↵ect of di↵erent determinants on compliance.
By doing this, they can show, for example, whether taxpayers are more a↵ected by the
probability of being caught or by an understanding of the social value of taxpaying, and by
how much. Field experiments, by investigating behavioural factors of taxpaying, can potentially
provide guidance on how to raise tax revenues in a cost-e↵ective way by changing perceptions
and the information available to taxpayers. This is particularly important given that credibly
increasing enforcement is very costly and not always desirable. With this information, policy-
makers can weigh their policy options and target their compliance strategies more specifically
to the factors that generate the larger responses at the most reasonable cost. In some cases,
researchers have studied existing initiatives of the tax administration, or variations in the law
or other relevant variables, to evaluate their e↵ect on compliance. These studies are natural
experiments or quasi-experiments, which are also included in this review. Although they do not
use randomisation through a formal control and treatment group, they are useful to evaluate
policy and are often able to establish causal e↵ects.
The types of experiment described so far also represent the evolution in time of this field of
research, which has seen tax experiments progressively moving away from theory and closer to
real life experiences. This movement from the lab to the field has involved both the introduction
of new questions and changes in the design of experiments. In addition to deterrence and
tax morale, new questions have focussed around more practical issues, such as the complexity
of tax systems, the incentives of tax collectors, and compliance costs for taxpayers. As far
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as research design is concerned, lab experimenters have made greater e↵orts to approximate
real life conditions by using tax specific language, simulations of exchanges of resources, and
participants with experience of taxpaying rather than students. However the lab is still an
artificial setting, so the movement to reality of TE can be considered completed only with large-
scale field experiments. In addition to being more realistic, field experiments involve much larger
samples than lab TE, therefore also benefiting from higher statistical power.
The types of TE described in this section are summarised in table 1, which necessarily makes
some over-simplifications – such as dividing the determinants of compliance into three general
categories of deterrence, tax morale and practical issues.
Table 1: Types of tax experiments
Lab Field Deterrence Tax
morale
Practical
issues
Speaking to theorists X X
Searching for facts X X X
Whispering in the
ears of princes
X X X X
1.2 Aim and relevance of this review
Against the background of section 1.1, this paper aims to update Torgler’s review of 2002 by
adding tax experiments that are whispering in the ears of princes. At the time Torgler (2002)
was published there was not an extensive literature of this sort - with the exception of Slemrod
et al. (2001) - which justified its exclusion from his review. However in the last decade field
experiments have been thriving, forming a growing strand of literature that can no longer be
ignored. This review aims to fill this gap, and is particularly relevant for three reasons.
The first one has to do with methods and to the ‘credibility revolution’ that applied economics
has been experiencing in recent years (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). Field experiments combine
rigorous methods with high policy relevance better than other methods in the tax compliance
literature. For this reason, Slemrod and Weber (2012) argue that they are the most credible
method to evaluate policy interventions to address tax compliance and, as such, they should be
used as a benchmark. Despite being at the basis of this ‘credibility revolution’, randomisation
has attracted both supporters and critics. The critics are particularly concerned with external
validity and with the possibility of scaling up interventions (Deaton, 2009; Basu, 2013). It is
certainly true that an experiment’s results are strictly valid only in the specific time and context
in which the experiment takes place. However, field experiments have an important advantage
over the typical randomised control trial. Because they can use population-wide data that is
nationally representative, they can directly evaluate options for real policy interventions that,
if proven e↵ective, are more easily scaled up to the national level. While the external validity
of a specific study to other countries remains a concern, it is possible to draw more general
conclusions as evidence keeps building up from di↵erent countries.
Secondly, and related to the previous point, this review makes a particular e↵ort to include
studies that focus on middle- and low-income countries. Most of the TE literature, as well
as the compliance literature more generally, has been largely concerned with Europe and the
U.S. However, more and more studies are being published with evidence from Latin America
and Asia, while a few are ongoing in Africa. Tax compliance can be seen as a global issue,
which all revenue administrations face to di↵erent extents, and whose possible determinants
are likely to be very similar across countries. However there are at least three reasons that so
far prevented field experiments from spreading more widely outside Europe and the U.S. The
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first one is related to data availability. In the past two decades, most low- and middle-income
countries have undergone great transformation in their tax administration by establishing semi-
autonomous revenue authorities, and more generally by modernising the way tax collection is
organised. This has entailed the digitalisation of tax records, which have become available to
researchers only recently. There are still data quality concerns that are likely to be more severe
than for more established administrations. Secondly, field tax experiments require a high degree
of commitment by the local government. Since most tax administrations in low-income countries
operate under great capacity constraints, it can be particularly challenging for them to find the
necessary resources to dedicate to tax research. Thirdly, because revenue administrations in
these countries are relatively new, they are developing only recently the practice of working
with researchers – this includes practical issues such as the appropriate anonymisation of data,
but also more generally trust and appreciation of the value of policy-relevant research.
Finally, field tax experiments use anonymised administrative data from tax returns. The
use of this data by researchers is a relatively new development in many countries, which partly
explains why this literature has expanded only recently. This type of data has at least two
important advantages. First, it allows the observation of actual taxpaying behaviour in real
life. However, since tax returns only capture what is known by the tax administration, they
do not allow the direct observation of tax evasion and avoidance. Experimental methods allow
researchers to address this problem, but only partially. Those taxpayers who are completely
informal - not registered for tax purposes - are still missed by field TE. Secondly, the e↵ective use
of administrative data requires a high degree of collaboration with the tax administration that
originally compiled and maintains the data. Therefore, these studies have a built-in connection
with policymakers, which is beneficial both to design relevant research projects and to make
results useful for supporting policy.
2 Review of tax experiments
This section reviews the tax experiments literature and is organised around eight issues that
matter for tax compliance. They are often interrelated, sometimes overlapping, and almost
always co-exist in various combinations. The main focus is on field TE, but evidence from lab
TE is also included. Although most lab TE belong to the early literature, they have recently
made advances in integrating methods from psychology to get additional insights into taxpayer
behaviour. Many of the hypotheses tested in field TE come from the lab literature, and it
therefore seems relevant to draw a clear connection between these distinct but highly interrelated
strands of literature. Furthermore, the main results reviewed here are sometimes cross-validated
against non-experimental studies that use data from tax returns. Since tax experiments are still
a relatively narrow strand of literature, linking them to the broader context helps to support
the empirical validity of their results.
2.1 Traditional economic factors of deterrence
The traditional economic factors set out in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) include variables
that influence the costs and benefits of evasion, such as: the tax rate, the probability of audit,
sanctions, and enforcement. Most of the early speaking to theorists lab TE test the e↵ects of these
variables on the probability of evading (the extensive margin), and the amount of taxes evaded
through income under-reporting (the intensive margin). The pioneering simulation study by
Friedland et al. (1978) analyses changes in the tax-paying behaviour of fifteen Israeli psychology
students when these economic factors vary. When the tax rate rose above a certain level, the
participants responded by sharply decreasing their reported income. Moreover, large sanctions
appeared to be more e↵ective than frequent audits in improving compliance. Finally, decisions
on the extensive and intensive margins are driven by di↵erent factors. While the tax rate seems
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to have the largest impact on the former, socioeconomic factors are more important to determine
the latter. However, conclusions from this experiment need to be taken with caution, because
of the small sample size and related power problems. An additional drawback is that in the lab
environment all the key variables are fully known to participants, while in real life probability
of audit is not known precisely and even the exact amount of sanctions can be uncertain.
Confirming the importance of uncertainty, Spicer and Thomas (1982) found that the pre-
dicted deterrence e↵ect of the probability of audit is only empirically valid when taxpayers have
full information about it. However, even when information is available, an increase in the prob-
ability of audit only a↵ects the decision to evade and not its extent. Beck et al. (1991) reinforce
these results by showing that, although evasion is lower when audit probabilities and sanctions
are higher, uncertainty weakens these e↵ects. Moreover, when actual variables are not known
due to uncertainty, perceptions play an important role. Spicer and Hero (1985) test two hy-
potheses with a group of thirty-six psychology students from the University of Colorado: first,
taxpayers evade more when they perceive that the level of evasion in general is higher; second,
those who have been audited in the past perceive a higher probability of audit and therefore tend
to evade less. The authors found no support for the former, but did find evidence for the latter.
Although these results still stem from highly artificial settings (including other studies such as
Mittone (1997)), with small samples of students, they help to understand the possible reasons
why compliance in real life is higher than in the theoretical model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). In the presence of uncertainty, taxpayers tend to evade less even if audit probabilities
and sanctions are low. This may be partly due to upwardly-biased perceptions of the risk of
being caught.
Turning to field experiments, Slemrod et al. (2001) carry out a pioneering study of this kind
based on a sample of 22,368 tax returns from taxpayers in Minnesota, USA. The authors, in close
collaboration with the Department of Revenue, collected income tax data for two subsequent
years: 1993 and 1994. The treatment consisted of a letter stating that the taxpayer had been
selected to be part of a study and that their state and federal tax returns would be closely
examined. The letter also stated that taxpayers would be contacted regarding any discrepancy
and that if any irregularities were found, their previous tax returns would be scrutinised as well.
The letters were sent by the Commissioner of Revenue in January 1995, at the beginning of the
filing season for 1994, to a treatment group of about 1,500 taxpayers. The letter was meant to
increase the perceived probability of audit and therefore to a↵ect the accuracy of income tax
reporting. A di↵erence-in-di↵erence methodology was used to analyse the changes in reported
taxable income between 1993 and 1994 in the treatment and control groups. Changes in reported
income were then used as an indication of changes in compliance, as data on the audit results
(the close examination) were not available to the authors.
Before discussing the results, it is worth noting that Slemrod et al. (2001) introduced two
methodological elements that are common to the rest of this literature. Firstly, the letters
are sent directly from the revenue administration. This helps to make the experiment real
and therefore to capture real behaviour. Secondly, the treatment does not change actual tax
parameters, such as the rate or the number of audits. Instead it only varies the taxpayers’
perceptions and the information available to them. On the other hand, Slemrod et al. (2001)
di↵er from other studies in the literature on at least two methodological choices. Firstly, in this
case the treatment is relatively strong, as it hints with some degree of certainty to an upcoming
scrutiny of the taxpayer’s return. Other experiments have adopted softer approaches that only
increase the salience of audits without hinting to an upcoming audit for any specific taxpayer
(Castro and Scartascini, 2013). Secondly, Slemrod et al. (2001) decide to let taxpayers know
that they were part of a study. Other researchers, such as Kleven et al. (2011), instead prefer to
conduct the study as if the treatment was a normal letter from the tax administration. By doing
this, they believe that the message may be taken more seriously. Clearly, taxpayers’ reactions to
the treatment are a mix of both things: they may know it is part of a study, but if the treatment
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is strong enough, as in the case of Slemrod et al. (2001), they are still likely to respond.
Indeed Slemrod et al. (2001) find that the letter had a significant impact on reported income,
in some cases increasing compliance by 12 per cent. However this e↵ect varies across categories
of taxpayers, who were stratified along two dimensions: income and opportunity to evade. The
latter is defined according to the type of income being taxed: high-opportunity occurs in presence
of self-reported income, or income from rents and royalties. In a situation of high opportunity
to evade, tax payments increased by 12 per cent for low- and middle-income taxpayers. Among
the high-opportunity taxpayers, those with self-reported income represented a major component
of the treatment e↵ect. For low-opportunity taxpayers in the low- and middle-income groups,
the letter had a much smaller e↵ect, although still positive. As far as high-income taxpayers are
concerned, the results instead are somewhat perverse: reported income decreased as a result of
the ‘threat of audit’ letter, indicating lower compliance as a result of increased audit probability.
One possible explanation is that high-income taxpayers sought professional advice in response
to the letter, which may have helped them to find legal ways to reduce their taxable income.
The authors underline a couple of caveats of the experiment design, which again are relevant
for other field TE as well. Firstly, some taxpayers may already have thought, before receiving
the letter, that the authority closely examines most returns, including theirs. In this case,
the taxpayers would not respond to the letter, because this treatment would not change their
perceptions on the probability of detection. Similarly, they may not believe that such close
inspection is actually capable of uncovering any wrongdoing, and therefore they may still not
modify their behaviour in response to the message. As highlighted in section 1 and further
discussed in section 2.5, the credibility of enforcement is a key issue. In the long term, a high
perceived probability of audit can only be sustained by a relatively high number of actual audits
and detections. Second, the indication in the letter that previous returns could also be inspected
may have induced taxpayers to maintain their reporting pattern to avoid uncovering a history
of non-compliance.
Kleven et al. (2011) largely confirmed the importance of deterrence by using administrative
data from the Danish tax collection agency, involving 42,800 randomly selected taxpayers in
2007 and 2008. In 2007, a group of these taxpayers was randomly selected for unannounced tax
audits. Irregularities were corrected and penalised according to the law. In 2008, both audited
and non-audited taxpayers were selected for pre-announced audits. Two treatments were tested
against a control group: one letter informed them that their tax return would certainly be
audited; and the other that half the people in the group would be audited. By doing this, the
treatment exogenously changed audit probabilities. In this case, participants were not aware of
being part of a study. The threats of audit had a large e↵ect on compliance, which was entirely
driven by self-reported income. An important advantage of Kleven et al. (2011) in comparison
to other field TE is that they had access to audit data and could therefore directly measure
variations in compliance. Importantly, audited taxpayers were selected randomly and not based
on risk, which would be endogenous to their evasion behaviour. Using this data, the authors
show that compliance rates in Denmark are high despite relatively high tax rates. Consistent
with the importance of having the opportunity to evade, third-party reporting environments
display close to full compliance, while substantial evasion occurs when income is self-reported.
In addition, the authors used a quasi-experimental setting to assess the e↵ect of changes in the
tax rate on compliance. In this case the research design exploits salient kinks in the income tax
schedule, and compares taxpayers on each side. Marginal tax rates do not seem to have a large
e↵ect on compliance.
Castro and Scartascini (2013) evaluated the e↵ectiveness of similar threatening letters in
Latin America. They analysed property taxes in a municipality in Argentina to test the e↵ect of
di↵erent factors on taxpayer compliance, including deterrence but also equity and fairness. This
property tax is based on the linear front size of the property, making the tax base observable
by the authorities. Therefore in this case, as in Kleven et al. (2011) though with a di↵erent
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method, the authors can directly measure compliance. Importantly, this tax is linked to the
provision of public goods by the same level of government that levies the tax. In total 23,000
individual taxpayers were randomly divided into four groups, three of which received a treatment
letter influencing their perceived probability of detection or their beliefs. All letters provided
information: the first one about enforcement and possible fines; the second one about other
taxpayers’ behaviour, thus a↵ecting beliefs on equity; and the third about how government
resources are used, thus underlining fiscal exchange. Compared with Slemrod et al. (2001) and
Kleven et al. (2011), the deterrence message here is much softer, along the following lines: “did
you know that if you do not pay your taxes on time you will have to pay sanctions and you
may be prosecuted?”. To make the message clearer and more salient, the authors included a
monetary example of underpayment with the relative amount of fines potentially due. This
message increased compliance by almost five percentage points, while the other treatments did
not have any e↵ects compared with the control group.
Other studies in the literature typically include a deterrence treatment along with other
factors. They generally find deterrence to be e↵ective (Fellner et al., 2013; Ariel, 2012; Bott
et al., 2014; Dwenger et al., 2014; Cummings et al., 2009). Since the main results are related to
the other factors explored, they are reviewed in other sections.
2.2 Social norms, equity, and moral appeals
As noted in section 1, tax morale is a broad concept that encompasses various factors. Based
on the classification of Luttmer and Singhal (2014), this section focuses particularly on intrinsic
motivation, culture, and peer e↵ects and social influences.
Some of the studies reviewed in the previous section also test the importance of social and
moral factors, in addition to traditional economic ones. Castro and Scartascini (2013) do not
find any significant e↵ect from the messages on equity and public services. In addition, a study
by Blumenthal et al. (2001) uses a very similar design and method as Slemrod et al. (2001)
and was also conducted in Minnesota. This time however the authors investigated the e↵ect
of moral appeals, using two treatments. The first one is a ‘support valuable services’ message,
communicating how taxes are spent and encouraging taxpayers to comply voluntarily to support
them. The second one is a ‘join the compliant majority’ message, indicating that the majority
of citizens comply with tax laws and that one should be compliant in order to be part of that
majority. Contrary to Castro and Scartascini (2013), who included their messages directly in
the tax bill, Blumenthal et al. (2001) sent dedicated letters. As in the rest of this literature,
the letters would start and end with the same text, a reminder of deadlines and indications
on where to get additional information, while the middle paragraph reported one of the two
messages above. The authors found little or no evidence that the letters resulted in any changes
in compliance behaviour, with high-opportunity taxpayers (defined as in Slemrod et al. (2001))
being even less likely to respond to normative appeals.
The lack of empirical support for the importance of moral and social factors may be due
to various reasons. Moral suasion may not have a large e↵ect if the elasticity of compliance to
perceptions is low. Moreover, evaders may have generally lower trust in government, therefore
making the moral appeals less e↵ective for them. However variations in compliance come from
precisely this group, as they have some margin to increase reported income. From a methods
perspective, Castro and Scartascini (2013) suggest that their ‘equity’ letter may have actu-
ally changed beliefs in unexpected ways. Taxpayers may have discovered that evasion is more
widespread than they thought, therefore being encouraged to evade more. This is probably
related to the specific message, illustrating the importance of the context and design of field
TEs. While for the U.S. Blumenthal et al. (2001) could state that ‘people who file tax returns
report correctly and pay voluntarily 93 per cent of the income taxes they owe’; the message in
Castro and Scartascini (2013) reads ‘did you know that only 30 per cent of taxpayers do not
pay the [property tax]?’. Since compliance levels are much lower for the Argentinian property
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tax than for the U.S. income tax, similar information messages may have very di↵erent e↵ects:
a feeling of unfairness towards the 30 per cent that do not pay in the former case and a feeling
of social shame for being part of a small minority (7 per cent) in the latter.
Moral appeals are also explored by Torgler (2004) in a field experiment conducted in col-
laboration with the local tax administration in Trimbach, Switzerland. Out of 580 randomly
selected taxpayers, in 2002 a sub-group of them received a letter signed by the commune’s fiscal
commissioner. The letter was sent in a separate envelope and printed on a pink sheet to increase
taxpayers’ awareness of it. Participants were not informed they were part of a study, to elicit
true behaviour. The relatively complex text of the letter alluded to factors such as: active citizen
participation in the life of the commune, citizens’ sense of responsibility, and the importance
of tax compliance in ‘preserving this democratic and liberal structure’ and to ‘keep Trimbach
attractive for its inhabitants’. The e↵ect of the letter was assessed against two compliance in-
dicators: timely filing and timely paying. From a methodological perspective, these compliance
indicators have the advantage of being observable – unlike the level of under-reported income
used in other studies. The results largely confirm the previous findings that moral suasion has
virtually no e↵ect on compliance. The treatment group did not significantly change the time-
liness of their returns or payments in response to the moral appeal. The relatively complex
treatment message may also be a reason for this lack of results.
Evidence on TV licences from Austria further supports the previous findings (Fellner et al.,
2013). This experiment involved a sample of 50,498 individuals that, contrary to the other
studies reviewed so far, is composed exclusively of potential evaders. This design feature has
implications for the interpretation of results since, as discussed above, evaders may be less
motivated by moral appeals. All taxpayers, except a control group of about 5 percent of the total
sample, received a letter from the Fee Info Service, the managing agency for the TV licence. One
group received a control letter containing a standard, neutral text. This standard text was then
complemented with three treatment messages: a threat, social information emphasising the high
level of compliance, and a moral appeal stressing fairness. Moreover, for some participants, the
threat treatment was combined with either social information or a moral appeal, making a total
of six di↵erent letters. The messages clearly indicated that participants were selected because
they were suspected of evasion, making treatments stronger. Compliance here is measured in
terms of new registrations, as a binary variable indicating whether an evader started to comply
or not. This feature makes this study di↵erent than the typical field TE, as tax administrations
usually do not know who the non-registered evaders are. Generally, the letters were e↵ective
in increasing new registrations, compared to the ‘no letter’ control group. However the bulk of
the e↵ect came from the neutral letter, indicating that the pure fact of receiving any letter may
be more e↵ective than the specific contents. Nonetheless, amongst the di↵erent treatments, the
threat message was the only one to have any e↵ect in addition to the neutral mail. A survey
designed to investigate the mechanisms of increased compliance, shows that it is mainly due to
a signal of surveillance and to increased sanction risk. Although the social information did not
increase compliance overall, there is substantial heterogeneity across regions. Where compliance
is relatively high, the message had a weakly negative e↵ect, while where it is relatively low, it
had a weakly positive one.
Further evidence on VAT payments by corporations in Israel supports the apparent ine↵ec-
tiveness of moral suasion (Ariel, 2012). Out of 4,395 Israeli corporations, two groups of about
730 taxpayers each received either a deterrence message or a moral appeal. The latter stressed
the social implications of non-compliance (‘we all su↵er from noncompliance’) and informed
companies how public money is spent. The study used gross sales values reported to the au-
thority, tax payments, and tax deductions as measures of compliance. None of the messages
significantly increased compliance. However, corporations receiving the moral appeal claimed
higher deductions, implying a decrease in government revenues. This backfiring e↵ect recalls
the perverse finding of Slemrod et al. (2001) where high income taxpayers decreased compliance
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as a result of the deterrence letter, and it may be motivated by similar reasons. Corporations,
much like high-income individuals, have large resources to dedicate to aggressive tax planning.
While these results may seem discouraging, lab experiments and recent field studies show
that moral and social factors can have an important role to play in increasing compliance.
Building on the methods of the early ‘searching for facts’ experiments (Bosco and Mit-
tone, 1997; Mittone, 1997), recent lab TEs linked the traditional economic factors even more
closely with methods and theories from psychology. For example, Coricelli et al. (2010) analyse
psychological costs and benefits of evasion using data from self-reports and skin conductance
responses.1 The experiment, involving eight subjects in each repeated round, showed that tax-
payers’ decisions to evade are dictated by the moral and emotional implications of cheating, and
not by monetary calculations alone. In addition, they show that public disclosure of deceptive
behaviour, achieved by displaying the picture of cheaters, deters evasion. Looking at repeated
rounds, they can show that audits decrease the extent of cheating in the next period, but larger
fines increase the proportion of evaded income. Still in a lab setting, Coricelli et al. (2014)
investigate two types of shaming: one that results in stigmatisation and exclusion from the
community, and another that leads to reintegration of the evader. In both cases the shaming
ritual involved displaying in public a picture of the evader, but in the reintegration treatment
the picture immediately disappeared. Stigmatisation and exclusion from the community signif-
icantly increased evasion compared to reintegration. Calvet Christian and Alm (2014) further
show that the promotion of empathy and sympathy can help to increase compliance.
Clearly, these studies su↵er from statistical power and from the artificiality of the lab setting.
However, they o↵er interesting insights into the emotional dimension of tax evasion that may
guide empirical investigations in the field. For example, some countries adopt policies of naming
and shaming that are the real-world equivalent of displaying images of cheaters in the lab. The
lab evidence shows that although they can be a powerful tool, the intense negative emotions
associated with stigmatisation should also be taken into account.
As far as large-scale field experiments are concerned, a recent study conducted in the United
Kingdom (Hallsworth et al., 2014) unpacks moral factors into social norms and concerns over
public goods. The basic message for the former was that the majority of people pay tax, while
the latter underlined the importance of taxes to finance public goods for all. Respectively three
and two variations of these short messages were used as alternative treatments, in addition to a
neutral control letter. For example the public goods message was phrased in a positive (‘Paying
tax means we all gain from vital public services’) and negative way (‘Not paying taxes means
. . . ’); while the three versions of the ‘minority norm’ message presented the same message in
various degrees of specificity to the individual. The most specific and strongest one stated that
‘nine out of ten people in the UK pay their tax on time. You are currently in the very small
minority of people who have not paid us yet.’ Similarly to Fellner et al. (2013), the letter is
directed to those who failed to pay on time (a sample of 100,000 individual taxpayers). Thus,
compliance can be fully measured, since the tax administration can observe whether and to
what extent taxpayers have paid due taxes. All letters resulted in an increase in the probability
to clear outstanding taxes, with the greatest e↵ect from the strongest version of the ‘minority
norm’ treatment. Although this treatment is designed around social norms, its e↵ect may also
be related to deterrence since it makes explicit that the revenue administration knows that the
recipient is not compliant. Following these results, the authors carried out a second experiment
where they compared the e↵ect of descriptive norms (i.e. how other taxpayers behave) and
injunctive norms (what other people think is the right thing to do). The former is found to have
a significantly larger e↵ect than the latter. These experiments show that large revenue gains
can be made by increasing moral costs to non-compliance, with negligible additional costs to
1Coricelli et al. (2010) report that “The SCR is a phasic component of the electrodermal activity primarily
controlled by the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system. It is associated to emotional arousal in
a wide range of psychological states and processes.”
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the revenue administration.
The importance of moral appeals is confirmed in a recent experiment carried out in Norway
among taxpayers who earned income in a foreign country (Bott et al., 2014). This type of income
is not pre-populated in the tax return, so compliance fully relies on self-declaration. However
the Norwegian Tax Administration recently gained access to third-party reports on this type of
income. These reports allowed the identification of a sample of taxpayers whose self-reported
amount was substantially di↵erent than the third-party reported one. In addition to a neutral
letter, three treatments were used: 1) an equity message reminding taxpayers that most people
pay their taxes fully and on time; 2) a message underlining the importance of taxes to finance
public goods and services; 3) a deterrence letter. The main result is a large and significant
e↵ect of the moral appeal, particularly the equity treatment. The amount reported by those
who received the moral treatment was almost double that of the base letter. Increasing the
probability of detection also had a large e↵ect on reported income, but in a di↵erent way. While
moral appeals resulted in increasing the amount of income reported – the intensive margin,
the detection message increased the number of people declaring foreign income – the extensive
margin. A complementary survey explored how the letters were perceived by recipients and
whether there were cross-contaminations whereby, for example, the moral treatment also a↵ected
the perceived probability of detection. The survey shows that moral appeals actually a↵ected
moral motivation rather than working through the probability of detection.
Del Carpio (2013) uses a mix of surveys and experimental methods to look at perceptions
of compliance and enforcement, where the latter is very similar to the social or minority norm
treatments used in the rest of the literature. The baseline survey reveals that in Peru the true
levels of both compliance and enforcement are generally underestimated. Exploiting this feature,
the experiment focuses on providing the true information on compliance and enforcement, both
in separate treatments and jointly in the same letter, as well as a neutral message to remind
of deadlines. The treatments’ e↵ect is evaluated on property tax payments in Peruvian munici-
palities. As in the case of Castro and Scartascini (2013), compliance is fully observable thanks
to cadastral registries that allow the distinction between taxpayers who comply and those who
don’t. The strongest e↵ect is generated by the information letter on true levels of compliance,
which increases payments by 20 per cent with respect to the no-letter control group. Compar-
ing this e↵ect with that of the neutral message reveals that about half of it is due to the pure
reminder e↵ect of the letter. Interestingly, the joint treatment, where both true compliance
and enforcement levels are revealed, has a lower e↵ect than the social norms treatment alone.
This can be interpreted as a crowding out of intrinsic motivations to comply. Moreover a post-
experiment survey shows that all treatments raise beliefs about compliance and enforcement
(except for the pure reminder that only a↵ects the former).
Other studies, which are reviewed in other sections, looked at moral suasion amongst other
factors and found both positive e↵ects (lab-in-the-field study by Torgler (2003)) and no e↵ect
(field TE by Dwenger et al. (2014)). Generally, the literature is not fully conclusive on the
e↵ectiveness moral and social factors. Within countries, they are likely to play an important
role in explaining the observed level of compliance. However, variations in compliance, which
is what field experiments capture, rely on evaders starting to comply. The fact that evaders
may be less a↵ected by moral and social appeals could therefore partly explain the lack of
significant results in many studies. Across countries, the same appeal is likely to have di↵erent
e↵ects in di↵erent social, institutional and cultural settings. However di↵erences in design
prevent direct cross-country comparisons, so we cannot identify how country-specific conditions
influence results.
2.3 Positive incentives
Positive incentives are closely related to moral and social factors, as they are meant to strike a
chord related to feelings of social acceptance and recognition. However, while moral messages
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appeal to intrinsic motivations, positive rewards have an element of extrinsic motivation, as
they can still be driven partly by self-interest. Contrary to deterrence, however, these incentives
provide positive rewards to taxpaying, rather than negative sanctions for evaders.
In an early lab study, Alm et al. (1992) tested four di↵erent options of positive rewards as
incentives for compliance: 1) a lottery that could be accessed by those who were tax compliant,
where the chance of winning was one in twenty-five; 2) a fixed reward for compliant subjects;
3) an audit reduction; and 4) a public good. The lottery had the largest e↵ect on compliance,
but it had the same expected value of the fixed reward. Audit reductions and public goods
improved compliance but less so than other treatments. The authors therefore concluded that
positive rewards need to be immediate and salient to have a significant e↵ect. In an attempt to
improve the realism of lab evidence, Torgler (2003) conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment in
Costa Rica using thirty-seven real taxpayers and real money, but neutral rather than tax-specific
language. The treatments focussed on fiscal exchange, moral suasion and positive rewards. The
results showed that positive rewards were most e↵ective in increasing compliance, followed by the
other two treatments. The number of subjects per treatment is very small (between eight and
thirteen) and hence, the statistical analysis may have su↵ered from power problems. Moreover
the experiment only included one round, so questions on the sustainability of moral suasion over
time and on learning e↵ects remain unanswered. While these two studies start shedding light on
the role of positive rewards, they su↵er from the typical limitations of the lab setting, including
artificiality and small sample sizes.
A field experiment from Germany (Dwenger et al., 2014) points to the importance of dis-
tinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of taxpaying. Intrinsic motivations are
related to social norms and feelings of guilt and shame, while extrinsic motivations have more to
do with enforcement and detection. The authors study a legally binding local church tax that
encourages overpayments, so individuals can be evaders, compliers, or donors. These groups can
be clearly distinguished because the relevant tax base used by the Church, reported taxable in-
come, is fully observable from tax declarations. While the Church in principle could cross-check
this data from the tax administration, it has never done so. This feature allows the identification
of taxpayers who comply entirely due to intrinsic motivations (20 per cent) and those who evade
in part or in full in absence of enforcement (80 per cent). Both groups received three sets of
treatments, in addition to a neutral letter, which aim to: 1) increase the salience of the tax and
inform taxpayers of the zero audit probability, to correct possible misperceptions about audits;
2) underline deterrence and communicate positive audit probabilities; and 3) appeal to moral
values and provide positive rewards. The first letter just confirms that there are no misper-
ceptions about the absence of deterrence, confirming that the group of compliers is intrinsically
motivated. Increasing the probability of deterrence increases compliance substantially only for
those taxpayers that are extrinsically motivated. Amongst the third set of treatments, a first
sub-set included social norms and moral appeals similar to other studies reviewed in section
2.2. These treatments do not produce any significant e↵ect, in line with most of this literature.
The second sub-set included public recognition and positive rewards. The former involved the
publication of compliant contributors’ names in the local newspaper, while the latter allowed
compliant contributors to take part in a lottery and possibly gain a monetary reward. An addi-
tional treatment combined both the recognition and monetary reward in the same letter. These
treatments had a positive e↵ect on compliance for the intrinsically motivated, with larger e↵ects
when social recognition was part of the treatment. However rewards further reduced compli-
ance for the extrinsically motivated – those who evade in absence of enforcement. A possible
explanation is that such rewards reinforced a view that tax payments are voluntary rather than
mandatory, and that enforcement is weak. These results show, importantly, that taxpayers’
responses to various treatments depend on what motivates them to pay taxes to start with.
An ongoing field experiment in Uruguay also focuses specifically on the relative e↵ectiveness
of positive and negative incentives on compliance. Although the study is currently ongoing, a
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pre-analysis plan includes the details of the research design (Dunning et al., 2014). The study
evaluates a policy initiative adopted by the municipality of Montevideo where a year-long tax
holiday is randomly allocated to compliant taxpayers as a reward for their honesty. Taxpayers
can enter a lottery if they have paid their taxes fully and in time, and thus have the chance to
win the prize. The study aims to evaluate the e↵ect on compliance for winning taxpayers, at
di↵erent time periods after they won the lottery. A complementary survey is planned to capture
the perceptions and other characteristics of winners and eligible non-winners. In addition a letter
experiment, focusing particularly on property taxes, will involve the following treatments: 1) a
reminder of deadlines as a placebo, 2) a reminder of the tax lottery and information about it, 3)
a reminder about the sanctions attached to non-compliance. Furthermore, additional treatments
add social motivations both to the positive and negative incentive messages. While the results
of this study are not yet available, they will certainly represent an important contribution to
the rather thin literature on the relative e↵ects of positive and negative incentives.
Taken together, the field studies in this section and section 2.2 show that the response to
social and moral factors is more complex and nuanced than previously documented in the lab.
This response is likely to be influenced by existing beliefs on compliance and enforcement (Del
Carpio, 2013) and by taxpayers’ initial motivations to comply (Dwenger et al., 2014). Given
this heterogeneity in taxpayers’ responses, lab TE’s small samples seem particularly unsuited to
analyse the complexity of real life behaviour.
While the existing evidence on rewards is still relatively thin, positive incentives are a con-
crete and potentially important policy option. Several countries in Africa have already recognised
this and have adopted various types of initiatives going in that direction. For example, countries
like Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Gambia regularly hold events called ‘Taxpayer appreciation day’
where compliant taxpayers are publicly recognised by the authorities and rewarded for their
contribution to the country’s development e↵orts. In some cases they are also provided with an
o cial certificate of compliance.
2.4 Fiscal exchange and accountability
Fiscal exchange is another one of the mechanisms of tax morale identified by Luttmer and Singhal
(2014). It refers to the hypothesis that taxpayers contribute to the public purse because they
appreciate the goods, services and guarantees that the government gives them in return. This
aspect is sometimes analysed by field TE in the context of moral appeals, when the message
underlines the importance of taxes to finance public goods (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Castro
and Scartascini, 2013). Some of the experiments discussed in section 2.2 include treatments
related to fiscal exchange. They generally find little support for its e↵ectiveness in increasing
compliance, revealing either no e↵ect (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Ariel, 2012), or smaller e↵ects
than other moral appeals (Hallsworth et al., 2014; Bott et al., 2014; Torgler, 2003) . However
others find some evidence that public service delivery may be an important component. For
example, Castro and Scartascini (2013) show that their treatments have heterogeneous e↵ects
based, amongst others, on the level of provision of public goods. While their evidence cannot
be considered as causal, their findings suggest that a higher level of public goods provision is
associated with higher compliance.
Building on previous lab studies showing that taxpayers evade less under conditions of un-
certainty (see section 2.1), Alm et al. (1992) show that this relation is reversed when public
goods are introduced in the experiment. When participants know that tax revenues are used to
benefit everyone, to simulate a public good, then increased uncertainty leads to less compliance.
This finding highlights the importance of the institutional environment in which the compliance
decision is made. Other lab studies argue that rational utility-maximising taxpaying behaviour
must take into account both tax payments and the transfers that result from the redistribution
of the tax yield. Two lab studies (Becker et al., 1987; Mittone, 1997) confirm this hypothesis by
showing that when taxpayers benefit from public spending, they are less likely to evade taxes.
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In addition Becker et al. (1987) find that the perceived equity in government transfers helps to
fight evasion. Still in the lab setting, Alm and Jackson (1993) analyse fiscal exchange, the use of
tax revenue, and the decision processes for deciding such uses. Individuals tend to comply more
when they know that the tax yield is spent on programmes they approve of and when they take
an active part in the decision on spending. Compliance is higher when the outcome of the vote
reflects widespread support rather than a close win. On the contrary, compliance is reduced
when unpopular expenditure programmes are imposed top-down on participants. Similarly, the
lab study by Lamberton et al. (2014) shows that allowing taxpayers to indicate preferences on
government spending increases tax compliance.
Cummings et al. (2009) use a lab-in-the-field experiment to analyse the role of governance
quality on compliance. Recognising the limitations of the lab, they also use survey data from
Afrobarometer to corroborate the results. To test the hypothesis that perceptions on the quality
of governance increase compliance, two parallel experiments are carried out in Botswana and
South Africa – two countries with similar tax systems but di↵erent political histories and insti-
tutions. This hypothesis is clearly related to tax morale more broadly, whereby the motivation
to pay tax derives from a social and moral obligation to contribute to society. However the
link between taxpaying and public goods, through service delivery, depends on the quality of
governance. The authors show that a lower level of governance is associated with lower compli-
ance. Moreover, while increasing enforcement always increases compliance, this e↵ect is larger
in presence of better governance. This finding is echoed in Torgler et al. (2007) who combine
findings obtained using survey data, macroeconomic indicators and experimental design. Not
only do they argue that governance quality matters for compliance; but also they identify the
quality of political institutions as one of the most important determinants. This broad indicator
includes aspects such as accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption.
Other studies have focussed on the relation between taxpaying and public accountability
using experimental or quasi-experimental methods, such as Paler (2013), Martin (2014) and
Gadenne (2013). However they have been more concerned with testing the hypothesis that
reliance on taxes has beneficial e↵ects on public accountability, than with the importance of the
latter as a motive for tax compliance. The first two are lab-in-the-field experiments, respectively
in Indonesia and Uganda, while Gadenne (2013) uses municipality-level data from Brazil in a
non-experimental setting. While they are beyond the scope of this review, it is worth mentioning
that they also provide evidence of a positive relation of tax revenues with public accountability
and the quality of public spending. In addition survey-based studies also support the fiscal
exchange hypothesis (Ali et al., 2015; Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001). Therefore they confirm
the potential importance that this aspect can play in increasing compliance. Clearly however, the
fiscal exchange motive involves important considerations about the quality of the institutional
environment. Although the evidence so far does not allow us to draw cross-country comparisons,
it is likely that low-income countries would find it particularly challenging to leverage this
determinant of compliance, given the lower quantity and quality of public services available.
Moreover, di↵erent types of public goods may generate di↵erent taxpayers’ responses. For
example, countries where violent crime is more widespread may respond more to appeals on the
importance of taxes to finance policing than to support other public services. A recent study
based on Afrobarometer data compares four African countries and explores fiscal exchange,
amongst others (Ali et al., 2015). It shows that the link between compliance and public service
delivery is based on specific services that are di↵erent in each country.
2.5 Information and third-party reports
One way in which revenue authorities can enforce tax laws is by making full use of information,
and particularly of third-party reports. This aspect is closely linked with the issue of deterrence
and probability of detection, since the e↵ective use of appropriate information increases the
probability of detection. Some of the studies reviewed in previous sections specifically show that
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the treatments are only or mostly e↵ective on those who self-report income (Kleven et al., 2011;
Slemrod et al., 2001; Bott et al., 2014). Kleven et al. (2011) argue that compliers are unable,
rather than unwilling, to cheat. In particular, taxpayers who are only subject to third-party
reporting (e.g. those only receiving wage income) may not be able to cheat even if they wanted to.
Therefore for this group the probability of audit is a poor proxy for the probability of detection,
as the authorities could easily uncover any irregularity simply by matching information reports
to tax returns. Consistently, Kleven et al. (2011) find the audit letters to be largely ine↵ective
amongst this group. Using audit data, they also show that while evasion in the third-party
reporting environment is close to zero, it is instead substantial in the case of self-reporting.
Interestingly this finding holds even considering individuals who earn both types of income, as
they fully comply for the portion of income that is third-party reported while they tend to evade
on self-reported income. This finding suggests that it is information reporting, rather than an
emotional or social aversion to cheat that drives compliance.
Pomeranz (2013) conducted a field experiment to look further into information as a key
determinant of compliance in Chile, in close collaboration with the Chilean tax authority. The
study focussed on VAT, which is often praised for its built-in incentive structure, triggered
by the verifiable paper trail it generates. If the self-enforcement properties of the VAT are
e↵ective, taxpayers’ response to increased probability of audit would be very low due to the
preventive deterrence e↵ect of the paper trail. To evaluate the validity of this hypothesis,
transactions that are covered by the paper trail (those between firms) are compared to those
that are not (those with final consumers). A first experiment involved sending letters to over
100,000 randomly selected firms, indicating increased audit probabilities. Consistent with the
hypothesis, the letters generated a strong increase in tax payments that is largely driven by sales
to final consumers, rather than by transactions between firms. Moreover small firms appear
to respond more, perhaps because they tend to have higher shares of retail sales. A second
‘spillover’ experiment looked particularly into the mechanism of the paper trail. In this case
half the sample received a pre-announcement of an upcoming audit. The full sample was then
audited and the information was made available to the authors. In addition data was collected
for the trading partners of the audited firms, before the audit. In presence of the paper trail,
one should observe a spillover e↵ect of the audit on the suppliers of the audited firms, which will
increase compliance as a result. Finding empirical support for this mechanism, this study argues
that the e↵ectiveness of the paper trail gets multiplied thanks to spillover e↵ects. The paper
trail allows the tax authority to easily identify discrepancies in reporting between the supplier
and the audited firm by cross-checking records, therefore encouraging suppliers to also comply
more.
Carrillo et al. (2014) show a fundamental limit of the role of third-party reporting, particu-
larly in countries where information and enforcement constraints are high. The study is based
on a natural experiment in Ecuador and focuses on corporate income taxes. While third-party
information has been available in Ecuador for some time, it is only recently that the tax au-
thority has started using it to increase compliance. In 2011 and 2012, the tax administration
notified about 8,000 firms of discrepancies between their self-reported revenue and third-party
information. Because the notification concerned tax returns for previous years, the response is
not due to changes in actual behaviour but only to changes in reporting. Therefore, even with-
out a control group, the reported values before the notification provide a counterfactual for the
true, post-notification reports, therefore allowing the identification of causal e↵ects. Third-party
reports show higher taxable income than the self-reported amount in 24 per cent of the cases.
Interestingly, under-reporting also seems to occur on firms’ expenditure, although third-party
information on costs is much more limited than for revenues. This experiment presents two
important results. Firstly, a substantial proportion of firms fail to file an amendment even after
receiving the notification. Under weak credible enforcement, firms still under-report revenues
because they do not believe the revenue authority has the ability to punish them even when
20
it has detected under-reporting. Increasing credibility would require the tax administration to
follow up on the notifications about discrepancies with actual audits. Failing that, taxpayers do
not seem to fully respond to the notifications. However audits are costly and many countries
simply do not have the capacity to follow up every case where evasion is suspected. There-
fore when traditional enforcement mechanisms are weak, third-party information may not be
e↵ective.
Secondly, amongst firms that do file an amendment, reported income increases by large
amounts. When firms are notified the exact amount in the third-party reports they tend to
amend for larger amounts (93 per cent of the discrepancy) rather than when they do not know the
specific amount (36 per cent on average). However, for every dollar of revenue adjustment, costs
tend to increase by 96 cents. The line item of increased costs most frequently adjusted is ‘other
administrative costs’, which is particularly di cult to verify because of its miscellaneous nature.
By amending both revenue and costs, post-amendment profits remain similar and therefore
increases in tax payments are limited. In other words, firms seem to adjust less monitored
margins (i.e. costs) as a response to increased monitoring on income. This result illustrates
how, in presence of incomplete information on all relevant dimensions of compliance, third-
party reporting may not have a large impact on revenue mobilisation. Importantly, the same
would happen when the information is available but taxpayers know the tax administration
cannot use it, typically because of administrative constraints.
While administrative constraints are certainly higher in low- and middle-income countries,
Slemrod et al. (2015) show that similar behaviour as documented by Carrillo et al. (2014)
occurs in the USA too. Since 2011, firms that process electronic payments (e.g. credit cards)
are requested to report this information to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These reports are
then used by IRS to cross-verify the income declared by small businesses. Although a clear e↵ect
of these information reports is di cult to identify, they seem to result in higher declared income
particularly for those firms that did not file in the previous year. Firms bunch at the exact
amount of the information reports, either because they fear that reporting less would trigger an
audit or because that amount accurately reflects true income. However many businesses report
equal amounts for income and costs, resulting in zero profits. This study reports some evidence
that the new information reports made firms more likely to do so. Therefore, as in the case of
Ecuador, the potential benefits from increased declared revenues were partly o↵set by increased
costs. Also in this case the adjustment occurred mostly through items that are di cult to
verify, such as ‘other expenses’. This study shows that using third-party reporting to improve
compliance of businesses may be challenging in all contexts. Contrary to wage income, business
income involves complex reporting requirements that o↵er more opportunities to minimise tax
payments through less verifiable components.
Despite these limitations, there is increasing evidence that a more e↵ective use of information
and IT can be beneficial for revenue administrations in developing countries. For example, two
recent non-experimental studies looked at the e↵ectiveness of electronic billing machines (EBM)
in Africa using data from VAT tax returns (Ali et al., 2015; Eissa and Zeitlin, 2014). They found
that both in Rwanda and in Ethiopia, firms substantially increased VAT payments after EBM
adoption, although the size of the increase varies across firms’ type, size, and sectors. However
it is still unclear whether these increased payments have been o↵set by other adjustments.
2.6 Tax collectors and their incentives
In addition to problems of capacity and enforcement, tax collections are likely to be constrained
by the presence of widespread corruption in tax administrations, particularly in low and middle
income countries. Particularly in countries where the use of IT systems and third-party reporting
is still limited, contact with tax collectors can be an important factor in explaining compliance.
Tax administrations may o↵er incentives to collectors to minimise the leakage of revenue into
corruption. The incentive may be, for example, to allow collectors to cash a share of tax revenues,
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thus increasing their overall salary. Particularly in low- and middle-income countries where
wages are relatively low, this monetary incentive is particularly salient. However, an adverse
consequence of such incentives may be to encourage collectors to use coercion and aggressive
methods to raise tax. There is evidence that shows that this may have the counterproductive
e↵ect of generating tax resistance and confrontation between taxpayers and the authorities, thus
eventually decreasing compliance (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2001). Although ‘tax farming’ may
be e↵ective in increasing revenue in the short run, it also bears some important political costs
that may be detrimental in the longer run.
A recent field tax experiment investigates the e↵ect of incentives for tax collectors both
on revenues and on taxpayers’ satisfaction with the practices of the tax department. Khan
et al. (2014) focus on property taxes in Punjab, Pakistan, and use both tax returns data and
a satisfaction survey. The treatments consist of three incentive schemes for collectors. The
first one is a pure revenue incentive, where they receive a percentage of any increase beyond a
benchmark level of revenue. This incentive is relatively large, as it can almost double their base
salary. The second incentive adds to the first one non-revenue outcomes, by adjusting the reward
according to measures of taxpayer satisfaction and the accuracy of tax assessments. The third
scheme aims to take into account the complexities of tax collection, which may not be easily
captured by objective measures. To do so, it is based on subjective assessments of managers
who distribute a fixed amount of bonus to a pool of good collectors.
The incentives are expected to interact with existing bribery in two possible ways: they
might result either 1) in higher tax payments with a lower level of bribes, or 2) in a constant
level of tax payments but higher bribes, as collectors now want to be compensated for a higher
foregone gain (the incentive). The results show that on average the treatments are e↵ective in
increasing revenue, while taxpayer satisfaction does not change significantly. The most e↵ective
treatment is the pure revenue incentive, while the second one has a smaller e↵ect and the third
no e↵ect. The additional revenue seem to come primarily from an increase in the tax base,
through new assessments and re-assessments, and from the recovery of arrears. Most of the
increases come from high-value properties, suggesting that collectors may be maximising the
amount of revenue from a few large taxpayers. This would also explain why the perception
of corruption and satisfaction does not decrease significantly on average. Overall, this study
suggests that incentives can provide an e↵ective way to increase revenue. Although they seem
to do so without much political cost, it is still unclear whether such costs may occur in a longer
time frame than the one in the study.
2.7 Complexity and compliance costs
Tax systems are typically complex and it is often di cult for taxpayers to fully understand them
in detail. This can result both in misperceptions about the system and in compliance costs, due
to the time and resources dedicated to tax filing. Therefore, complexity and compliance costs
may be an important element in explaining mis-reporting and non-compliance, in addition to
plain tax evasion. Compliance costs are particularly relevant for small taxpayers and businesses,
as well as first-time filers. There is evidence that small businesses face a cost of up to 15 per cent
of their turnover, while this percentage is lower for larger businesses (Coolidge, 2012). Moreover,
taxpayers in low- and middle-income countries are particularly a↵ected, due to lower literacy
and less availability of trained accountants. As a result, they may file only partially, not file
at all, or not do so in time, therefore being partially or fully non-compliant. Modern revenue
authorities are making greater e↵orts to simplify their procedures and to act as tax educators.
However, complexity and compliance costs remain real, practical constraints in many countries.
A recent natural experiment used administrative data to show that taxpayers are often
confused by complex tax systems (Feldman et al., forthcoming). This study, conducted in the
United States, analyses labour responses to the loss of Child Tax Credit when a household’s
child turns seventeen. The loss of Child Tax Credit results in a lump sum increase in tax
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liabilities but not in a change of the marginal tax rate. However the authors show that confused
taxpayers respond to this change by interpreting it as an increase in their marginal tax rate,
thus documenting a substantial degree of misperception of the tax system.
In addition to misperceptions, taxpayers may actually lose out because of the complexity of
the system and the compliance costs associated with it. Benzarti (2014) uses administrative data
from the IRS to show that taxpayers forego large amounts of money because of the compliance
cost associated with reporting deductions. Taxpayers in the U.S. have two choices: they can
itemise all deductions or claim a standard amount. Itemising results in a monetary benefit
when the sum of all itemised deductions is larger than the standard one. If tax filing is costly,
rational taxpayers should only itemise when the benefits are higher than the costs of doing
so. This is mostly a time cost, due to two elements: record keeping and actual filing. The
study reveals that the average taxpayer foregoes $617 that could have been saved by itemising
deductions. However, there is large heterogeneity amongst taxpayers. Richer households lose
more than poorer ones through this mechanism, perhaps because they value their time more (as
a result of wage di↵erences). These compliance costs are higher than previously documented,
either because of actual compliance costs or a psychological bias against tax filing. Similarly,
Gillitzer and Skov (2013) report a large amount of under-reporting of charitable contributions,
which could be deducted, with a resulting loss for taxpayers. The natural experiment in this
case comes from the introduction of third-party reports for donations by the Danish revenue
administration. Since 2008, these reports were used to pre-populate tax returns. This measure
resulted in doubling the number of tax deductions claimed, and a 15 per cent increase in the
value of these claims. This shows that taxpayers were foregoing tax benefits, as there is no
evidence of an actual change in charitable giving around the time of the reform.
2.8 Learning and long-term perspective
Some of the letter treatments reviewed so far, and particularly those related to deterrence
(section 2.1), have large e↵ects on compliance. However, is that e↵ect sustainable or is it a
simple nudge? Do taxpayers learn from these treatments? In a way, these questions are related
to the issue of credibility of enforcement discussed by Carrillo et al. (2014). Taxpayers may react
to a threat of audit, but they may go back to their previous behaviour if no action follows that
threat. Field tax experiments typically evaluate only the immediate e↵ects of treatments, since
obviously it takes time to observe longer-run e↵ects. However, for policy purposes, it is important
to know whether the same measure can be repeated every year with similar results; whether
taxpayers will learn from such interventions and therefore do not need regular communications;
or perhaps if such interventions should be used only for new taxpayers. All these questions bring
into the discussion a longer-term perspective and considerations on sustainability.
A recent paper explored these issues by looking at take-up of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) in the U.S. (Manoli and Turner, 2014). Naturally, the paper focuses on a country with
a longer history of tax experiments, therefore building on previous work. In order to increase
take-up of the EITC, the IRS sends out notices to taxpayers who seem eligible but who have not
claimed the tax credit. The authors are particularly interested in understanding whether these
notices have purely short-term nudge e↵ects, or if they also produce longer term learning e↵ects.
Firstly, a descriptive analysis of tax returns data shows that information and knowledge of the
benefit schedule is indeed linked to low take-up. The study is then based on three experimental
components. The first one exploits a computer glitch that resulted in the failure to notify a
number of taxpayers who should have been notified. By comparing the group who received the
notice and those who did not (but should have), the authors show large nudge e↵ect of the
notices on take-up, with a substantial gain of about 4 per cent of labor income as a result of the
credit. However such e↵ect gradually disappears, decreasing drastically in the year following the
notice and disappearing completely three years later. The second component largely confirms
these results by using data from EITC-eligible taxpayers in California in 2009. It looks at
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di↵erent informational treatments, rather than just the di↵erence between receiving a notice or
not. The sample is composed of taxpayers who had already received a notice previously but
did not respond. The simplest and most salient notice has the largest nudge e↵ect, as can be
expected. However in the years after the treatment the di↵erences between treatment notices
disappear, as none of them induces meaningful learning e↵ects. The third component looks
at taxpayers who did not claim their tax credit and who were selected for a random audit.
Following the audit, they were found to be eligible for the EITC. This can be seen as a more
heavy-handed treatment than notices, and may be expected to have a larger learning e↵ect for
taxpayers. Although learning e↵ects appear to be larger than those of the notices, they still
seem to fade away two years after the audit. While the smaller sample size in this component
calls for some caution, the results are in line with the previous ones. Generally, they suggest
that regular notices may be needed to increase take-up, as it seems very di cult to generate
learning e↵ects about the tax code.
Importantly, learning does not happen only through the revenue administration or through
o cial measures more generally. A recent natural experiment (Alstadsaeter et al., 2014) shows
that family networks are an important channel for transmitting information about the tax
system. In particular the authors look at a well-defined, legal tax shelter in Norway. Using
tax returns data, they exploit a discontinuity in the availability of the tax shelter that allows
them to compare similar individuals who have or do not have access to it. By doing this, they
show that similar individuals, with similar social networks, have di↵erent taxpaying behaviour
according to whether or not they are part of a network including an eligible individual. These
results suggest that taxpayers a↵ect each other along social networks, which are therefore an
important element in explaining tax avoidance and evasion.
3 Conclusions
The TE literature has developed greatly in the last decade, from lab studies to large-scale
field experiments. The latter have a few important advantages over the former: they are fully
embedded in real taxpaying situations, thus being more suitable as a basis for policy advice; they
benefit from more statistical power as samples are much larger than what the lab previously
allowed; and they provide further insights into the heterogeneity of taxpayers’ responses to
various determinants of compliance. While it is clear that deterrence messages a↵ect particularly
taxpayers with self-reported income (Slemrod et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011), other factors such
as the level of compliance in the community (Fellner et al., 2013), existing beliefs on enforcement
and compliance (Del Carpio, 2013; Carrillo et al., 2014), and taxpayers’ motivations to comply
(Dwenger et al., 2014) all matter to explain the results. With field experiments, this literature
is moving away from purely theoretical hypotheses to more practical policy questions, around
enforcement constraints and third party reports. Therefore the label ‘whispering in the ears of
princes’ seems particularly appropriate to underline this higher policy relevance.
Although field experiments are a relatively new and narrow strand of literature, they still
present important di↵erences in methods. The following list names the most notable ones:
• Natural experiments exploit exisiting circumstances, while the typical letter experiment is
set up by researchers in collaboration with the tax administration.
• Sample sizes di↵er greatly, from a few hundred (Ariel, 2012) to several thousands (Pomer-
anz, 2013; Dwenger et al., 2014).
• Compliance is defined in various ways: in terms of outstanding payments (Hallsworth
et al., 2014), as new registrations (Fellner et al., 2013), or as increases in reported income
(Slemrod et al., 2001).
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• Most recent field TE use a neutral ‘control’ letter to isolate the e↵ect of simply receiving
any letter from the e↵ect resulting from the specific content of the letter. This has proven
particularly important as indeed the control letter has been found to be responsible for a
large portion of the results in some cases (Fellner et al., 2013).
• Although the treatment messages are inspired by similar theoretical hypotheses, they are
translated in practice with various degrees of complexity. While Hallsworth et al. (2014)
and Castro and Scartascini (2013) only make small variations to a standard message,
Slemrod et al. (2001) or Torgler (2004) changed entire paragraphs.
• The treatment message can be embedded in the tax bill (Castro and Scartascini, 2013) or,
as in most cases, be sent as an independent letter.
• The studies reviewed look at di↵erent tax types, including VAT (Pomeranz, 2013), personal
income taxes (Bott et al., 2014), corporate taxes (Ariel, 2012), and property taxes (Castro
and Scartascini, 2013). Although compliance issues are common across tax types, the
compliance and enforcement levels di↵er, with possible implications on the results (see
section 2.2).
Importantly, these di↵erences are likely to matter for results – making rigorous and context-
appropriate research designs crucial to their credibility. In addition, more nuanced results can be
shown in studies that analyse sub-groups separately. The absence of any e↵ect at the aggregate
level may hide heterogeneous responses across groups (Fellner et al., 2013).
Despite these di↵erences across individual studies, this literature points to a few common
results on what matters for compliance. Deterrence factors seem to be the most e↵ective method
to increase compliance in the short run, but its e↵ect may not be sustainable over time (Manoli
and Turner, 2014) and in presence of weak follow-up enforcement (Carrillo et al., 2014). The
evidence on moral appeals and social norms is less conclusive. However, these factors, as well
as positive rewards, can be e↵ective strategies to increase compliance in some cases (Hallsworth
et al., 2014; Dwenger et al., 2014). Factors other than deterrence are particularly important
for two reasons. The first one, mentioned before, has to do with the sustainability of threats in
weak enforcement environments. Increasing actual enforcement is very costly and in most cases
it is not optimal for tax administration to check all taxpayers who can be suspected of evasion.
Therefore, it makes sense to explore compliance strategies that are more cost e↵ective. Secondly,
an approach based only on deterrence could fuel a confrontational relationship between citizens
and the state, which in turn may increase taxpayers’ resistance and lower compliance. Last but
not least, there are some important practical issues that act as obstacles to compliance, such as
the complexity of tax systems and compliance costs.
This review has made a particular e↵ort to include evidence from all regions of the world,
in a literature that is largely dominated by Europe and the U.S. The increasing availability of
tax returns data from low- and middle-income countries is allowing researchers to draw a more
global picture than in the past. Generally, the types of issues that emerge as key determinants
of compliance are very similar across countries. However, there are important context-specific
factors that a↵ect both results and policy implications, such as beliefs on enforcement and
motivations to comply. A case in point are moral appeals including information on existing
compliance levels: while they may be e↵ective in countries with low evasion, they can backfire
where evasion is widespread (see section 2.2). In addition, while in rich countries threats of audits
are likely to be more credible, they may not be taken seriously in contexts where administrative
constraints are well known. Again, heterogeneity matters as large taxpayers are still less likely to
be a↵ected by such threats in any country. In conclusion, it is still di cult to identify systematic
di↵erences across countries from this literature. Cross-country comparisons are particularly hard
because any di↵erence in results may be due to variations in context, design, or both.
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Looking forward, this literature certainly promises to provide further useful insights on com-
pliance both for the research community and for policymakers. There are at least three directions
for further research emerging from this review. Firstly, there is still a lack of evidence from Asia,
Latin America and, particularly, Africa. A few ongoing studies are starting to fill this gap, and
more work needs to be done to build a truly global body of knowledge. Secondly, this literature
would benefit from more standardised methods across studies. Although research design needs
to take the context into account, researchers should make greater e↵orts to achieve compara-
bility across studies. Finally, there are a number of practical issues that are known to matter
for compliance but lack su cient rigorous evidence. For example, we know that complexity
and compliance costs are important constraints, particularly in low-income countries. However,
there is still relatively little experimental evidence, mostly from natural experiments, on what
tax administrations can do to tackle them. Moreover, the issue of informality remains largely
untouched in this literature. Although this is largely due to the use of administrative data,
which naturally excludes the informal sector, it may be possible in some cases to look at new
registrations by matching tax data with other sources of information - for example, from banks.
Finally, further studies should keep making e↵orts to disaggregate e↵ects along dimensions of
heterogeneity that can o↵er a more nuanced picture of compliance.
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